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Financial networks are dynamic. To assess their systemic impor-
tance to the world-wide economic network and avert losses we need
models that take the time variations of the links and nodes into ac-
count. Using the methodology of classical mechanics and Laplacian
determinism we develop a model that can predict the response of
the financial network to a shock. We also propose a way of measur-
ing the systemic importance of the banks, which we call BankRank.
Using European Bank Authority 2011 stress test exposure data, we
apply our model to the bipartite network connecting the largest in-
stitutional debt holders of the troubled European countries (Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland). From simulating our model we
can determine whether a network is in a “stable” state in which
shocks do not cause major losses, or a “unstable” state in which
devastating damages occur. Fitting the parameters of the model,
which play the role of physical coupling constants, to Eurozone crisis
data shows that before the Eurozone crisis the system was mostly in
a “stable” regime, and that during the crisis it transitioned into an
“unstable” regime. The numerical solutions produced by our model
match closely the actual time-line of events of the crisis. We also
find that, while the largest holders are usually more important, in the
unstable regime smaller holders also exhibit systemic importance.
Our model also proves useful for determining the vulnerability of
banks and assets to shocks. This suggests that our model may be a
useful tool for simulating the response dynamics of shared portfolio
networks.
Financial Crisis | Stress Test | Systemic Risk | Linear Response | Phase
Transition | Bipartite Network
Significance
We propose a simple yet powerful deterministic model for a
fully dynamical bipartite network of banks and assets and ap-
ply it to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The results closely
match real-world events (e.g., the high risk of Greek sovereign
bonds and the failure of Greek banks). The model can be
used to conduct “systemic stress tests” to determine the vul-
nerability of banks and assets in time-dependent networks. It
also provides a simple way of assessing the stability of a sys-
tem by using the ratio of the log returns of sovereign bonds
and the stocks of major holders. We also propose a “systemic
importance” ranking, BankRank, for these dynamic bipartite
networks.
Recent financial crises have motivated the scientific com-munity to seek new interdisciplinary approaches to mod-
eling the dynamics of global economic systems. Many of the
existing economic models assume a mean-field approach, and
although they do include noise and fluctuations, the detailed
structure of the economic network is generally not taken into
account. Over the past decade there has been heightened in-
terest in analyzing the “pathways of financial contagion.” The
seminal papers were by Allen and Gale [1, 2] and these were
following by many other studies [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Economists
have recently become aware that econometrics has tradition-
ally paid insufficient attention to two factors: (i) the struc-
ture of economic networks and (ii) their dynamics. Studies
indicate that a more thorough approach to the examination
of economic systems must necessarily take network structure
into consideration [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
One example of this approach is the work of Battiston et
al. [17]. They study the 2008 banking crisis and use net-
work analysis to develop a measure of bank importance. By
defining a dynamic centrality measurement called DebtRank
that measures interbank lending relationships and their im-
portance in propagating network distress, they show that the
banks that must be rescued if a crash is to be avoided (those
that are “too big too fail”) are the ones that are more “cen-
tral” in terms of their DebtRank.
Another recent event that has motivated and provided
the focus for our study reported here is the 2011 European
Sovereign Debt Crisis. It began in 2010 when the yield on
the Greek sovereign debt started to diverge from the sovereign
debt yield of other European countries, and this led to a Greek
government bailout [18]. The nature of the sovereign debt cri-
sis and resulting network behavior that we analyze here dif-
fers somewhat from that of the US banking crisis. Here we
focus on the funds that several Eurozone countries—Greece,
Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS)—had borrowed
from the banking system through the issuing of bonds. When
these governments faced fiscal difficulties, the banks holding
their sovereign debt faced a dilemma: should they divest some
of their holdings at reduced values or should they wait out the
crisis. The bank/sovereign-debt network that we analyze in
this study is a bilayer network. Although DebtRank has also
been used to study bipartite networks, e.g., to describe the
lending relationships between banks and firms in Japan [19],
it does not take into account that link weights exhibit a dy-
namic behavior.
Huang et al. [20] and Caccioli et al. [21] analyzed a simi-
lar problem, that of cascading failure in a bipartite network of
banks vs assets in which risk propagates among banks through
overlapping portfolios (see also Ref. [22]). Although net-
work connections in real-world financial systems, e.g., inter-
bank lending networks or stock markets, are dynamic, neither
of the above models [20, 21] take this into account. Other
models by Ha laj and Kok [23], which use simulated networks
similar to real systems, or by Battiston et al. [24] allow the
nodes to be dynamic but not the links (see, however, Ref. [25],
in which dynamic behavior occurs when a financial network
attempts to optimize “risk adjusted” assets [26]). Our ap-
proach differs from both of these because by introducing only
two parameters which play the role of coupling constants in
physics we can enable all network variables to be dynamic.
Our model is related to Caccioli et al. [21] and Battiston et
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al. [17] but differs in that we allow both nodes and links to
be dynamic.
We use a time-slice of the GIIPS sovereign debt holders
network from the end of 2011 to focus on a simplified version
of the network structure and use it to set the initial conditions
for our model.1
We start by proposing, solely on phenomenological
grounds, a set of dynamical equations. Based on our anal-
ysis we observe that:
1. When we model how a system responds to an individual
bank experiencing a shock, our analysis is in accordance
with real-world results, e.g., in our simulations Greek debt
is clearly the most vulnerable.
2. The dynamics arising from our model produces different
end states for the system depending on the values of the
parameters.
In order to determine which banks play a systemically dom-
inant role in this bipartite network, we adjust the equity of
each bank until it goes bankrupt and then quantify the impact
(the BankRank) of the bank’s failure on the system. We sim-
ulate the dynamics for different parameter values and observe
that the system exhibits at least two distinctive phases, one
in which a new equilibrium is reached without much damage
and one in which the monetary damage is quite significant,
even devastating.
The GIIPS problem
Governments borrow money by issuing sovereign (national)
bonds that trade in a bond market (which is similar to a stock
market2).
Our GIIPS data are from the 137 banks, investment funds,
and insurance companies that were the top holders in the GI-
IPS sovereign bond-holder network in 2011. (Hereafter we will
use “banks” to refer to all these financial institutions.) Table 1
shows the percentages of the sovereign bonds issued by each
Table 1. Total amount of exposure of the banks in our data set to the sovereign
debt of the GIIPS countries
Greece Italy Portugal Spain Ireland
Total (bnEu) 64.85 330.38 30.63 151.15 18.41
% in Banks 23.67 20.13 23.81 21.81 20.55
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Fig. 1. (Left) A sketch of the network of banks vs assets. It is a directed, weighted
bipartite graph. The thicknesses represent holding weights. Motion along the edges
from banks to assets is described with the wighted adjacency matrix A and the op-
posite direction, assets to banks, is described with AT . (Right) sinh−1(A) with
A being the weighted adjacency matrix of the GIIPS holdings, (weighted by amount
of banks’ holdings in GIIPS sovereign debt expressed in units of millions of Euros.
The vertical axis denotes different banks (121 of them) and they are ordered in terms
of their total exposures to GIIPS debt (higher exposure is at the bottom of the plot)
Because holdings differ by orders of magnitude we have plotted sinh−1 A here.
GIIPS country owned by these banks. Since our model re-
quires knowing the equity of each bank, we reduce our dataset
to the 121 banks whose equity value was obtainable. By the
end of 2011, two important Greek banks—the National Bank
of Greece and Piraeus Bank—had negative equities. Because
our model only considers banks that can execute trades based
on positive capital, we also had to eliminate these two banks
from our analysis. Figure 1 shows the weighted adjacency
matrix of this network.3
When a country defaults on sovereign debt (or stops pay-
ing interest as it comes due) the consequences are usually
grave. To prevent cascading sovereign defaults, the Euro-
pean Union, the European Central Bank, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund jointly established financial programs
to provide funding to troubled European countries. Funding
was conditional on implementing austerity measures and sta-
bilizing the financial system in order to promote growth and
increase productivity. We use our sovereign debt data as the
initial condition for a model of cascading distress propagating
through a bipartite bank network in which banks only affect
each other through shared portfolios. In order to develop a
framework for analyzing these problems that goes beyond sim-
ply determining how distress propagates through the links, we
construct a model in which dynamic change affects both the
weights of links and the attributes of nodes. Figure 1 shows
the weighted adjacency matrix of this network in log format.
Model
The system that we study is a bipartite network as shown
in Fig. 1. On one side we have the GIIPS sovereign bonds,
which we call “assets,” and on the other we have the “banks”
that own the GIIPS bonds. The nodes on the “asset” side are
labeled using Greek indices µ, ν.... To each asset µ we assign
a “price,” pµ(t) at time t. The “bank” nodes are labeled using
Roman indices i, j.... Each bank node has an “equity” Ei(t),
a time t, and an initial value of asset µ. Each bank in the
network can have differing amounts of holdings in each of the
asset types. The amount of asset µ that bank i holds is de-
noted by Aiµ(t), which is essentially an entry of the weighted
adjacency matrix A of the network. In our model we begin
with a set of phenomenological equations describing how each
of the variables Ei(t), Aiµ(t), and pµ(t) evolve over time. A
key feature of our model is that the weights of links Aiµ are
time-dependent, and this introduces dynamics into our net-
work.
Assumptions, simplifications and the GIIPS system. The key
assumptions that differentiate our model from other banking
system or dynamic network models are:
1. The banks do not exclusively trade with each other. They
may trade with an external entity, which may be the Eu-
1To assess the robustness of our model, we use what we learn about the GIIPS network structure
and apply it to simulations of other networks of varying sizes and distributions. These results are
available in the supporting materials.
2The entity that issues a bond (e.g., the government in case of sovereign bond) promises to pay
interest. Governments also promise to return the face value of the loan at the “maturity” date.
Bonds, unlike stocks, have maturities and interest payments. A detailed description of some of
these bond characteristics can be found in Ref. [27]. As is the case with stocks, the value of these
sovereign bonds increases when countries are doing well, and supply and demand ultimately deter-
mine the value of the bonds. If, however, the country becomes troubled and the market perceives
that the government will not be able to pay back the debt, the price of the bond can crash, which
was the case of Greece.
3The intensity of the color is proportional to Arcsinh(A) for better visibility. For large Aiµ,
arcsinh(A) ≈ log(2A).
4This is appropriate in the case of GIIPS sovereign debt because, in addition to the ECB (which
buys some of the bonds if there is a need to stabilize the system), a large number of investors hold
GIIPS sovereign debt. This is important to keep in mind because in most problems associated with
banking or financial networks agents are assumed to be trading with each another.
2 www.pnas.org — — Footline Author
ropean Central Bank (ECB) or other, smaller investors.
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2. When there is no change in equity, price, or bond holdings,
nothing happens and there is no intrinsic dynamic activity
in our financial network.
3. The model describes the short time response of the system
and disregards slow, long-term driving forces of the market.
4. We assume the agents in the system will copy each others
actions, producing the so-called “herding effect.” This is
why we assume the “coupling constants” (the free param-
eters) are the same for all agents.
Notations and Definitions
We denote by A the weighted adjacency matrix, the compo-
nents of which Aiµ are the amount of exposure of bank i to
asset µ. The equity Ei of a bank is defined as
Ei =
∑
µ
Aiµpµ + Ci − Li.
Here pµ is the “price ratio” of asset µ at a given time to its
price at t = 0, Ci is the bank’s cash, and Li is bank’s liability.
These parameters evolve in time. Bank i will fail if its equity
goes to zero,
if : Ei = 0 → Bank i fails.
We assume that the liabilities are independent of the part of
the market we are considering and are constant. For conve-
nience we define
ci ≡ Ci − Li.
Two other dependent variables that we use are the “bank
asset value” Vi ≡ ∑µAiµpµ and the total GIIPS sovereign
bonds on the market Aµ ≡∑iAiµ. In our model we assume
that α and β are constant. Everything else is time-dependent.
The time evolution of GIIPS holdings and their price. For
changes in equity we have
δEi =
∑
µ
((δAiµ)pµ +Aiµδpµ) + δci.
Here we assume that the cash minus liability changes accord-
ing to the amount of money earned through the sale of GIIPS
holdings,
δci = −
∑
µ
(δAiµ)pµ + δSi(t),
where the minus sign indicates that a sale means δAiµ < 0 and
this should add positive cash to the equity of bank i. δSi(t)
is the cash made from transactions outside of the network of
Aiµ. The first term in δci cancels one term in δEi and we get
(all at time t)
δEi =
∑
µ
Aiµδpµ + δSi(t).
In the secondary market for the bonds (where issued bonds are
traded in a manner similar to stocks) the prices are primarily
determined by supply and demand. We use a simple model
for the pricing that should hold as a first-order approximation.
We assume the price changes to be
δpµ(t+ τA) = α
δAµ(t)
Aµ(t)
pµ(t),
Here the coupling constant α is essentially the “inverse of
the market depth,” i.e. the fraction of sales (δA/A required
to reduce the price by one unit (δp/p) is equal to 1/α. We
are assuming that the market is “liquid” meaning that any
amount of assets can be sold or bought without a problem.
We have defined δpµ(t) ≡ pµ(t) − pµ(t − δt) is the change in
price from the previous step, δAµ(t) = Aµ(t)−Aµ(t− δt) the
net trading (number of purchases minus sales) of asset µ, and
τA the “response time of the market.” We choose the same
“inverse market depth” for all GIIPS holdings µ, assuming
that they belong to the same class of assets. We then define
how the GIIPS holdings are sold or bought, i.e., we define
δAiµ. We also include a “panic factor” β that indicates how
abruptly distress propagates when a loss is incurred, and a
“market sensitivity” factor α that indicates how quickly the
price of an asset drops when part of it is sold. These variables
are summarized in Table 2.
We assume that if a bank’s equity shrinks it will start
selling GIIPS holdings in order to continue meeting its liabil-
ity obligations, and that if a bank’s equity shrinks because
of asset value deterioration it will sell a fraction of its entire
portfolio to ensure meeting those obligations. The amount of
GIIPS holdings sold will depend on how panicked the bank is,
i.e., on the value of “panic factor” β. A bank thus determines
what fraction of its equity has been lost in the previous step
and sells according to
δAiµ(t+ τB) = β
δEi(t)
Ei(t)
Aiµ(t),
where τB is the “response time of the banks.” Here we assume
that banks purchase using the same protocol as when selling
and sell the same fraction of all their GIIPS assets. The
above equations can be converted to differential equations by
simply replacing δF → dF/dt. If we assume that the time
lags are small, we can expand the equations with τA, τB to
first-order and get
dF (t+ τ)
dt
≈ d
dt
(
F (t) + τ
dF
dt
)
For brevity, we define ∂t ≡ ddt . The three equations become:(
τB∂
2
t + ∂t
)
Aiµ(t) = β
∂tEi(t)
Ei(t)
Aiµ(t) [1](
τA∂
2
t + ∂t
)
pµ(t) = α
∂tAµ(t)
Aµ(t)
pµ(t) [2]
∂tEi(t) =
∑
µ
Aiµ(t)∂tpµ(t) + fi(t). [3]
where fi = dSi/dt has the meaning of external force. where
τB is the time-scale in which Banks respond to the change,
and τA is the time-scale of market’s response.
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Table 2. Notation
symbol denotes
Aiµ(t) Holdings of bank i in asset µ at time t
pµ(t) Normalized price of asset µ at time t (pµ(0) = 1)
Ei(t) Equity of bank i at time t.
β Banks’ “Panic” factor.
α “Inverse market depth” factor of price to a sale.
5Without a time lag, these equations would be primarily constraint equations relating the first-order
time derivatives of E, p,A to each other. Note however that in simulating this dynamic system
the order in which we update the variables matters because most of the nontrivial dynamic behavior
follows from this time lag between updates.
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Fig. 2. Estimates of γ = αβ over 4 months periods. Top: the shaded purple
region is the error-bars based standard deviation and the solid lines are the averages
of different γ calculated for each country. Bottom: Calculation of γµ for individual
countries. The fact that the values for different countries are close to each other is a
sign that our assumption of “herding” (i.e. same α and β for all GIIPS) is justified
and that our model is applicable here. As can be seen, before the height of the crisis
0 < |γ| < 1 and then it gradually grows. At the height of the crisis γ ≈ 2.
After the crisis we see γ decrease again to γ < 1. Later we show that at γ < 1
the system rolls into a new equilibrium, but when γ > 1 the asset prices crash.
Also note the timeline of bailouts: Greek bailout approved 2010/04 and 2010/09;
Irish bailout 2010/10. these explain part of the movements in the lower plot. The
following stock tickers were used for each country (only the top 4 holders of each
GIIPS for which stock prices were could be obtained from Yahoo! Finance): Greece:
NBG, EUROB.AT, TPEIR.AT, ATE.AT; Italy: ISP.MI, UCG.MI, BMPS.MI, BNP.PA;
Portugal: BCP.LS, BPI.LS, SAN; Spain: BBVA, SAN; Ireland: BIR.F, AIB.MU, BEN
In our simulations we use these differential equations and
choose τA = τB = 1. One of them can always be chosen as a
time unit and set to one, but setting them equal is an assump-
tion and may not be true in reality. Our analysis showed that
the choice of τA,B does not affect the stability of the system
and that the stability only depends on α, β and the shock. The
fi(t), which are changes in the equity from what banks own
outside of this network, can be thought of as external noise or
driving force. We use fi(t) to shock the banks and make them
go bankrupt. We shock a single bank, say bank j, at a time
by reducing its equity 10% by putting6 fi(t) = sEjδijδ(t).
7
Starting with ∂tpµ(−ε) = ∂tAiµ(−ε) = 0, plugging ∂tEi into
[1] and integrating over a small interval t ∈ [−ε,+ε] yields
∂tAiµ(+ε) ≈ βAiµ(0) ln(1 + s) [4]
This and Ei(ε) = (1 + s)Ei(0) are the initial conditions we
start with. In addition, we require E,A, p ≥ 0 during the
simulations.
Application to European Sovereign Debt Crisis
We apply our model to the GIIPS data mentioned above. Be-
fore looking at the simulations of Eqs. [1]–[3], we estimate
the values of our parameters in the case of the GIIPS sovereign
debt crisis.
Estimating values of γ = αβ. We use approximate versions
of Eqs. [1]–[3] to estimate the product of parameters α and
β (details of the approximation and the assumptions are dis-
cussed in the SI). The distribution of the assets is roughly
log-normal, so a small number banks hold a significant por-
tion of each GIIPS country’s debt. Thus using only the equity
of the dominant holders and denoting their sum by E∗(µ) for
country µ will give us a good estimate of γ. We estimate that
the response times τA, τB are at most on the order of several
days. Thus we will calculate γ = αβ over a period of four
months to allow the system to reach its new final state, and
we can discard the second-order derivatives. This allows us to
write
δAµ ≈ β
∑
i
δEi
Ei
Aiµ ≈ β
δE∗(µ)
E∗(µ)
A∗µ,
where E∗(µ) denotes the equity of the dominant bank for as-
set µ. Using this approximation we can relate the first two
equations8,
δpµ
pµ
≈ αδA
∗
µ
A∗µ
≈ αβ δE
∗
(µ)
E∗(µ)
.
Thus we can approximate γ as
γ ≈ δpµ/pµ
δE∗(µ)/E
∗
(µ)
. [5]
We evaluate γ for each country µ. If the values are similar for
different µ values it may indicate that the “herding effect” is
a factor. This both supports our model and suggests that it is
applicable to this problem. We evaluate γ for the time period
between early 2009, when the crisis was just beginning, and
early 2011, when most government bailouts had either been
paid or scheduled.
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Fig. 3. Shocking “Bank of America” with α = β = 0.6. Left: plot of Asset
prices over time. Greece incurs the greatest losses, falling to 75% of original value.
Final prices are listed in the legend. Right: Equities of the 4 “most vulnerable banks”
(2 of major Greek holders incur large losses and one Italian bank is predicted to fail due
to the shock). IT043 is Banco Popolare, which has very small equity but large Italian
debt holdings. The next two are Agricultural Bank of Greece and EFG Eurobank
Ergasias, which are among top 4 Greek holders.
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Fig. 4. Simulation for larger values of α and β (values in legends are final price
ratios pµ(tf )). This time, in addition to Greek debt, Spanish and Portuguese debt
show the next highest level of deterioration. The same four banks are the most vul-
nerable and this time two more of them fail. At α = β = 1.5 the damages are
much more severe than at α = β = 0.6.
6Note that the magnitude of the shock only rescales time, according to Eq. [ 3 ] because
fi → λfi is the same as ∂t → λ−1∂t and thus τA,B → λτA,B
7δij is the kronecker delta, or the identity matrix elements, and δ(t) is the Dirac distribution or
impulse function.
8 The equity of the banks is mostly comprised of the shareholders’ equity, or common stocks. These
banks usually have multiple stock tickers, but there is generally one or two main stock tickers where
most of the equity is. We can use the movements in these main stocks to estimate δE∗(µ)/E
∗
(µ).
For this approximation we use the following formula:
δE∗(µ)
E∗
(µ)
=
Ef − Ei
(Ef + Ei)/2
where Ei is the stock price at the beginning of the period and Ef is at the end of it.
4 www.pnas.org — — Footline Author
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Fig. 5. Left: Top: BankRank [6 ]: Ranking the banks in terms of the effect of their failure on the system. Top plot shows the ratio of final total GIIPS holdings in the
system to the initial total GIIPS holdings. In this test we do two things. First we increase the equity of the 4 most vulnerable banks up to their total holdings (Ei →
∑
µ Aiµ).
Then, in each run, we adjust one bank’s equity to just below the minimum equity that would allow it to survive the dynamics (the threshold is found empirically). The initial
shock to the system is imposed through shocking the equity of a different bank (not the one we artificially brought to bankruptcy). This way the BankRank tells us how
much monetary damage the failing of one bank would cause. The ranking changes slightly for different values of α and β. At low values, e.g. α = β < 1, the total
assets completely determines the ranking. But at larger values, i.e. the “unstable” regime, the correlation reduces significantly. Right: a scatter plot of the BankRank at
α = β = 0.4 (vertical axis) versus total holdings over maximum holding (Holding/max), and versus BankRank for other values of parameters at α = β = 0.6, 1.0, 1.5.
BankRank at γ = αβ < 1 is directly anti-correlated with the initial holdings. BankRank at γ = αβ > 1 isdifferes significantly from α = β = 0.4, which tells us that in
the unstable regime γ > 1 it is no longer true that only the largest holders have the highest systemic importance.
If we assume that the number of shares issued by our banks
were roughly constant over the period in question, the move-
ments in stock prices may be used as a proxy for the changes
in the equity of banks. Many of the major movements (or
slope changes) in each country’s γ values seem to coincide
with bailout payment times.
Figure 2 shows the average γ values during this period
with standard deviation error-bars. The bottom of the fig-
ure gives estimates for α and β assuming |α| = |β|. A more
detailed plot with individual values of γ obtained using each
country is also shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 2 shows that before the crisis 0 < |γ| < 1 and at its
height γ > 1. Below we will explore the phase space in terms
of different values of α and β. An important finding is that
our model predicts that γ > 1 is an unstable phase in which a
negative shock to the equity of any bank will cause most asset
prices to fall dramatically to nearly zero. Similarly, a positive
shock will cause the formation of bubbles. When 0 < γ < 1,
on the other hand, after a shock the system smoothly transi-
tions into a new equilibrium and, although some banks may
fail, no asset prices will fall to zero.
Simulations
We find that when values of α and β are small, e.g., |αβ| < 1,
shocking any of the banks in the network will result in the
same final state (see Fig. S2). This is a new stable equi-
librium. If we shock the system a second time the prices do
not change significantly, i.e., less than 0.1%). Figure 3 shows a
sample of the time evolution of the asset prices and the equity
of the banks that incurred the largest losses.
Figure 3 shows results that seem in line with what actu-
ally happened during the European debt crisis, although the
damage shown for Ireland is less than what actually occurred.
In this figure, bailouts are disregarded. Three of the four most
vulnerable banks (MVB) shown in Figs. 3 and 4 are holders
of Greek debt. In this simulation, Greek debt is the asset that
loses the most value. Note that the loss prediction produced
by the model is based solely on the network of banks hold-
ing GIIPS sovereign debt and provides information about the
economies of these countries, with Greece experiencing the
largest loss, followed by Portugal (real-world data indicates
that Ireland’s loss was as severe as Portugal’s).
Note that the new equilibrium depends on α and β. Re-
turning to the real data, Fig. 2 shows that before the onset of
the crisis the system responds to a shock by achieving a new
equilibrium similar its initial equilibrium (behavior similar to
that shown in Fig. 3). At the height of the crisis, however,
when γ = αβ ≈ 2, even a small shock can have a devastat-
ing effect and precipitate a crisis (see Fig. 4). Although many
banks incur significant losses when α and β values are at their
highest, the same four banks fail.
In the SI we show the effect of rewiring the banks who lend
to each country, meaning we take Aiµ and take random per-
mutations of index i so that the equities of banks connected to
each country changes randomly. Interestingly, such a rewiring
changes the damages suffered by GIIPS bonds entirely, mean-
ing that Greece will no longer be the most vulnerable. This
shows that in our model, while qualitative behavior of the
system only depends on α and β, the final prices and equities
depend strongly on the network structure.
Systemic Risk and BankRank
We thus take a different approach. We find that a bank can
cause a large amount of systemic damage when its equity level
is at the bare minimum necessary to survive a shock. Banks
with very low equity fail rapidly, no longer trade, and thus
no longer transmit damage to the system. Banks with equity
sufficient to survive for a significant period of time, on the
other hand, continue to transmit damage into the system and
thus cause more damage than extremely weak banks. Based
on this observation we rank the banks using a “survival eq-
uity ratio” (SER), i.e., the fraction of actual equity a bank
needs in order to survive systemic shock. The total damage
done to the system varies significantly from bank to bank. To
rank the systemic importance of each bank we measure the ef-
fect their failure has on the system. Since normally no banks
other than the four mentioned above fail, we modify the data
slightly. The steps we take are as follows:
1. We increase the equity of the four failing banks to Ei(0) =∑
iAiµ(0) to keep them from failing and significantly dam-
aging the system. Then when γ = αβ < 1, the system be-
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comes resilient to shocks and the drop in prices falls below
1% (the system has reached a stable phase). When γ > 1
the system continues to incur significant losses.
2. To assess the systemic importance of bank i, we run sepa-
rate simulations with initial conditions changed to Ei(0) ∈
[103Ei(0), 10
−8Ei(0)], until we find the threshold of sur-
vival under a small shock to any other bank j (i 6= j).
3. We calculate the total GIIPS holdings
∑
k(A · p)k left in
the system.
We define “BankRank” of i to be the ratio of the final hold-
ings to initial holdings if bank i fails, i.e. BankRank of i is
equal to the amount of monetary damage the system would
take if bank i fails:
BankRank of i : Ri =
∑
j(A · p)j(tf )∑
j(A · p)j(0)
∣∣∣∣∣
Shocking i
. [6]
The smaller the value of Ri, the greater the systemic impor-
tance of bank i.
Fig. 5 on the left shows the BankRank in the unstable
regime at α = β = 1.5 and how it compares to the initial hold-
ings, minimum ratio of equity required for survival, and initial
equities. We observe some correlation between BankRank and
each of these variables, but for many banks BankRank does
not seem to follow any of these variables. On the right of
Fig. 5, on the top left we see that BankRank in the stable
regime at α = β = 0.4 has very high correlation with the ini-
tial holdings. In the other three plots on the right we see that
BankRank changes significantly when we transition from the
stable to the unstable regime. This again indicates that, while
in the stable regime holding almost completely determine the
systemic importance of a bank, in the unstable regime this
is no longer the case and many small holders will have high
systemic importance.
Conclusion and Remarks
We study the systemic importance of large institutional hold-
ers of GIIPS sovereign debt and propose a simple, dynamic
“systemic risk measurement,” which we call BankRank. We
do not find any definitive correlation between BankRank
and diversification, but there is a strong correlation between
BankRank and total GIIPS holdingsq. Our model describes
the response of the GIIPS system to shocks well enough to re-
veal a “herding effect,” i.e., its presence is indicated whenever
a single value for the parameters can be used for the whole
system. Our methodology (i) can be used to model “systemic
risk propagation” through a bi-partite network of banks and
assets, i.e., it can serve as a “systemic stress testing” tool for
complex financial systems, and (ii) it can be used to identify
the “state” or “phase” in which a financial network resides,
i.e., if a banking system is in a fragile state we can quantify it
and determine how to transition the system into a more stable
state.
We suggest that our model could be useful as a monitor-
ing and simulation tool that allows policy makers to identify
systemically important financial institutions and to assess sys-
temic risk build-up in the financial network.
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Supporting Information
Testing the Role of the Network
Our goal is to determine how much of the above behavior is caused by the network structure and how much by the value of the
outstanding debts. To examine the dependence of the results on network structure, i.e., to determine which banks hold which
country’s debt and how much bank equities matter, we randomize the network and redo our analysis. We do not change the
value of the total GIIPS sovereign debt held by the banks. We only rewire the links in the network, changing the amount of
debt held by each bank and the countries to which each bank lends money.
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Fig. S1. Randomizing which bank lends to which country, while keeping total debt constant for each country. The results differ dramatically from the real world data used
in Fig. 3. In this example Portugal and Italy lose the most value, while Greece is the least vulnerable. Other random realizations yield different results.
Figure S1 shows an example of this randomization and how dramatically it changes the end result, and it demonstrates
two important features of the model: (i) system dynamics are strongly affected by network structure, i.e., knowing such global
variables as the equity and exposure of individual banks is not sufficient, and (ii) real-world data seems to indicate that it was
the structure of the network of lenders to Greece that caused Greek sovereign bonds to become the most vulnerable. This
suggests that our model may be useful as a stress testing tool for banking networks, or any network of investors with shared
portfolios.
Shocking different banks
0 20 40 60 80 100 1200.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Final Price Ratios pµ (tf )/pµ (0) at α=β=0.6
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Ireland
Fig. S2. Shocking different banks at α = β = 0.6. The final prices turn out very similar.
Fig. S2 shows the final prices found from shocking different banks. They are all almost identical. However, the small
variation and the variations in the Aiµ(tf ) can be used to construct BankRank and find that different banks have different
mounts of influence.
The Banks
The listed banks, insurance companies, and funds in the order of largest holders of the GIIPS holdings is given in table 3.
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Table 3. GIIPS debt data used in the analysis. All numbers are in million Euros. Our data is based on two sources: 1) The EBA 2011 stress test data, which only includes
exposure of European banks and funds (these are the ones where the “Code Name” is of the form CC123); 2) A list of top 50 global banks, insurance companies and funds
with largest exposures to GIIPS debt by end of 2011 provided by S. Battiston et al. (These have a name as their “Code Name”), which was consolidated by us.
Name Code Name Holdings Equity Greece Italy Portugal Spain Ireland
0 GESPASTOR Gespastor 3.5e+02 1.6e+03 0 0 0 3.5e+02 0
1 M&G M&G 37 1.1e+04 0 0 37 0 0
2 UNION INVESTMENT Union Inv. 3.4e+03 7e+02 1.6e+02 2e+03 77 1e+03 1.5e+02
3 ATTICA BANK Attica 1.8e+02 1.5e+04 1.8e+02 0 0 0 0
4 MILANO ASSICURAZIONI Milano Assic. 74 9.3e+02 23 0 0.71 49 2.1
5 GROUPAMA Groupama 4.4e+02 4.3e+03 0 4.2e+02 19 0 0
6 AEGON NV Aegon 1.1e+03 2.6e+04 2 65 9 9.8e+02 26
7 RIVERSOURCE River Source 48 7.4e+03 48 0 0 0 0
8 AVIVA PLC Aviva 1.1e+04 1.8e+04 1.5e+02 8.4e+03 2.3e+02 1.4e+03 7.2e+02
9 EMPORIKI BANK Emporiki 2.9e+02 1.2e+03 2.9e+02 0 0 0 0
10 MELLON GLOBAL Mellon 16 2.8e+04 0 0 0 0 16
11 DAIWA Daiwa 7.1e+02 7.3e+03 0 5e+02 0 2e+02 0
12 FIDEURAM Fideuram 2e+03 5.5e+02 0 2e+03 0 0 0
13 UNIPOL Unipol 1.3e+04 2.5e+03 26 1.2e+04 1.5e+02 1.1e+03 2.4e+02
14 WGZ BANK AG WESTDT. GENO. DE029 3.6e+03 1.9e+03 3.2e+02 1.4e+03 4.6e+02 1.2e+03 2.2e+02
15 JYSKE BANK DK009 1.2e+02 1.4e+04 64 0 19 15 22
16 OESTERREICHISCHE VOLKSBANK AG AT003 3.7e+02 4.8e+02 1.1e+02 1.5e+02 29 66 13
17 CAIXA PORTUGAL Caixa (PT) 8.1e+03 2.4e+04 35 4.6e+02 30 7.5e+03 44
18 BLACKROCK Blackrock 2e+03 2e+04 1.2e+02 1.1e+03 29 7.1e+02 30
19 BANK OF AMERICA BofA 3.8e+02 1.8e+05 13 2.5e+02 5.4 83 29
20 NORDEA BANK AB (PUBL) SE084 1.6e+02 2.6e+04 0 97 0 64 1.4
21 CAJA DE AHORROS Y M.P. ES077 1.5e+03 - 0 0 0 1.5e+03 0
22 SELLA GESTIONI Sella 6.6e+02 1.3e+02 0 6.6e+02 0 0 0
23 MITSUBISHI UFJ Mitsubishi 1.6e+03 8.1e+04 0 9.2e+02 71 5.2e+02 62
24 UBS UBS 1.3e+03 4.8e+04 53 6.8e+02 55 4.4e+02 42
25 OPPENHEIMER Oppenheimer 2.4e+02 3.8e+02 15 0 0 2.2e+02 0
26 VONTOBEL Vontobel 18 1.2e+03 18 0 0 0 0
27 NOMURA Nomura 39 1.8e+04 0 0 20 0 19
28 MACKENZIE MacKenzie 15 3.4e+03 15 0 0 0 0
29 AGEAS Ageas 5.3e+03 7.8e+03 6.4e+02 2e+03 1e+03 1.1e+03 5.1e+02
30 DEUTSCHE POSTBANK De.Postbank 9.2e+02 5.7e+03 9.2e+02 0 0 0 0
31 MORGAN STANLEY Morgan Sta. 4.6e+02 5e+04 0 4.6e+02 0 0 0
32 HELVETIA HOLDING Helvetia 1e+03 3.6e+03 7.6 7.2e+02 18 2.4e+02 15
33 HWANG-DBS Hwang 23 8.7e+02 23 0 0 0 0
34 ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI Generali 1.7e+04 1.8e+04 1.3e+03 5.4e+03 3.1e+03 5.7e+03 1.7e+03
35 AMLIN PLC Amlin 15 1.6e+03 0 0 0 15 0
36 SWISS LIFE HOLDING Swiss Life 5.9e+02 7.5e+03 30 1.7e+02 77 1.8e+02 1.3e+02
37 PHOENIX GROUP Phoenix 3.2e+02 2.8e+03 0 2.3e+02 11 76 2.2
38 PRICE T ROWE PT Rowe 15 2.6e+03 0 0 0 0 15
39 AXA Axa 2.9e+04 4.9e+04 7.6e+02 1.7e+04 1.5e+03 9.4e+03 7.5e+02
40 TOKIO MARINE Tokio Marine 56 1e+04 0 0 30 0 26
41 ROTHSCHILD Rothschild 1.1e+02 6e+02 61 0 52 0 0
42 TT ELTA AEDAK TT Elta Aedak 27 9.3e+02 27 0 0 0 0
43 BALOISE Baloise 7.9e+02 3.2e+03 84 2.7e+02 98 2.3e+02 1.1e+02
44 NATIXIS Netaxis 3.3e+03 2.1e+04 4.3e+02 1.3e+03 3.9e+02 8.6e+02 3.9e+02
45 CREDIT AGRICOLE FR014 1.7e+04 4.9e+04 6.6e+02 1.1e+04 1.2e+03 3.9e+03 1.6e+02
46 JULIUS BAER Jul. Baer 1.2e+02 3.5e+03 68 0 0 0 57
47 FRANKLIN TEMPLETON Franklin Temp. 5.1e+03 9.7e+03 0 0 0 0 5.1e+03
48 NOVA LJUBLJANSKA BANKA SI057 1.7e+02 - 20 96 15 26 15
49 STATE STREET State St. 51 1.6e+04 0 0 27 0 24
50 ALLIANZ Allianz 3.8e+04 1e+05 6.2e+02 2.9e+04 7.5e+02 7.1e+03 4.9e+02
51 VIENNA INSURANCE Vienna 93 5e+03 21 13 0 7 52
52 BANCO POPOLARE - S.C. IT043 1.2e+04 33 87 1.2e+04 0 2e+02 0
53 COMMERZBANK AG DE018 2e+04 2.5e+04 3.1e+03 1.2e+04 9.9e+02 4e+03 32
54 LEGAL & GENERAL L&G 3.8e+02 6.3e+03 1.1 3.3e+02 6.6 35 4.4
55 EFFIBANK ES063 3e+03 2.7e+03 37 0 16 2.9e+03 0
56 INTESA SANPAOLO S.P.A IT040 6.2e+04 6.4e+05 6.2e+02 6e+04 73 8.1e+02 1.1e+02
57 IRISH LIFE AND PERMANENT IE039 1.9e+03 3.5e+03 0 0 0 0 1.9e+03
58 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC GB089 1.5e+04 1.3e+05 1.3e+03 9.9e+03 1e+03 2e+03 2.9e+02
59 DANSKE BANK DK008 1.2e+03 1.3e+05 1 5.8e+02 1.1e+02 1.2e+02 4.1e+02
60 ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GB088 1e+04 9.6e+04 1.2e+03 7e+03 2.9e+02 1.5e+03 4.5e+02
61 BNP PARIBAS FR013 4.1e+04 8.6e+04 5.2e+03 2.8e+04 2.3e+03 5e+03 6.3e+02
62 BARCLAYS PLC GB090 2e+04 8e+04 1.9e+02 9.4e+03 1.4e+03 8.8e+03 5.3e+02
63 LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC GB091 94 5.8e+04 0 32 0 62 0
64 DEUTSCHE BANK AG DE017 1.3e+04 5.5e+04 1.8e+03 7.7e+03 1.8e+02 2.6e+03 5.3e+02
65 SOCIETE GENERALE FR016 1.8e+04 5.1e+04 2.8e+03 8.8e+03 9e+02 4.8e+03 9.8e+02
66 BPCE FR015 8.5e+03 4.1e+04 1.3e+03 5.4e+03 3.5e+02 1e+03 3.4e+02
67 BBVA ES060 6.1e+04 4e+04 1.3e+02 4.2e+03 6.6e+02 5.6e+04 0
68 BANK OF VALLETTA (BOV) MT046 24 - 10 3.9 2.8 0 7
69 BANCO BPI, SA PT056 5.5e+03 8.2e+02 3.2e+02 9.7e+02 3.9e+03 0 2.8e+02
70 BANCO SANTANDER S.A. ES059 5.1e+04 2.6e+04 1.8e+02 7.2e+02 3.7e+03 4.6e+04 0
71 CAIXA DE AFORROS DE GALICIA, ES067 4.7e+03 2.3e+04 0.0022 1.6e+02 1.3e+02 4.4e+03 0
72 CAIXA D’ESTALVIS DE CATALUNYA ES066 2.8e+03 2.3e+04 0 0 0 2.8e+03 0
73 CAJA DE AHORROS Y PENSIONES ES062 3.7e+04 2.2e+04 0 1.3e+03 26 3.5e+04 0
74 KBC BANK BE005 7.9e+03 1.7e+04 4.4e+02 5.6e+03 1.6e+02 1.4e+03 2.7e+02
75 ERSTE BANK GROUP (EBG) AT001 1.2e+03 1.5e+04 3.5e+02 6e+02 1e+02 1.4e+02 40
76 JP MORGAN JPM 17 1.5e+05 0 0 17 0 0
77 BAYERISCHE LANDESBANK DE021 1.3e+03 1.4e+04 1.5e+02 5.1e+02 1.1e-05 6.6e+02 20
78 BFA-BANKIA ES061 2.5e+04 1.2e+04 55 0 0 2.5e+04 0
79 SNS BANK NV NL050 1e+03 5.4e+03 47 7.6e+02 0 57 1.6e+02
80 RAIFFEISEN BANK (RBI) AT002 4.6e+02 1.1e+04 1.7 4.5e+02 2.1 3.5 0.00016
81 DZ BANK AG DT. DE020 8.7e+03 1.1e+04 7.3e+02 2.7e+03 1e+03 4.2e+03 51
82 F VAN LANSCHOT Lanschot 18 7.4e+02 0 0 0 0 18
83 ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC IE037 6.5e+03 1.4e+04 40 8.2e+02 2.4e+02 3.3e+02 5e+03
84 SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN SE085 6.3e+02 1.2e+04 1.2e+02 2.9e+02 1.3e+02 86 0
Continued on next page
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85 IBERCAJA Ibercaja 9.6e+02 2.7e+03 0 0 0 9.6e+02 0
86 LANDESBANK BADEN-WURT... DE019 2.8e+03 9.5e+03 7.8e+02 1.4e+03 95 5.4e+02 0
87 BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL, S.A. ES064 9.7e+03 9.1e+03 0 2.1e+02 6.4e+02 8.9e+03 0
88 CAJA ESP. DE INVER. SALAMANCA ES070 7.6e+03 - 0 0 27 7.6e+03 0
89 NORDDEUTSCHE LANDESBANK DE022 2.8e+03 6.5e+03 1.5e+02 1.9e+03 2.6e+02 5e+02 41
90 BANCA MARCH, S.A. ES079 1.5e+02 6.5e+03 0 0 0 1.5e+02 0
91 OP-POHJOLA GROUP FI012 43 6.2e+03 3.1 0.36 0.00093 0.07 40
92 BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES, PT054 7.4e+03 4.4e+03 7.3e+02 50 6.5e+03 0 2.1e+02
93 BANCO DE SABADELL, S.A. ES065 7.4e+03 5.9e+03 0 0 91 7.3e+03 38
94 HYPO REAL ESTATE HOLDING AG, DE023 1.1e+04 - 0 7.1e+03 4.9e+02 3.4e+03 44
95 FRANKLIN ADVISERS INC Franklin Adv. 3.6e+02 4.7e+02 0 0 0 0 3.6e+02
96 ABN AMRO BANK NV NL049 1.5e+03 2.8e+02 0 1.3e+03 0 1.1e+02 1.3e+02
97 MUENCHENER RV Munich RV 8.2e+03 2.3e+04 5.8e+02 3.6e+03 4.2e+02 1.9e+03 1.8e+03
98 HSH NORDBANK AG, HAMBURG DE025 1e+03 4.8e+03 1e+02 6.6e+02 62 1.8e+02 0
99 GRUPO BANCA CIVICA ES071 4.8e+03 - 5.4 0 0 4.7e+03 0
100 CAIXA GERAL DE DEPOSITOS, SA PT053 6.8e+03 5.3e+03 51 0 6.5e+03 2e+02 23
101 CAJA DE AHORROS DEL MEDITER... ES083 5.6e+03 3.8e+03 0 20 4.8 5.6e+03 15
102 GRUPO BMN ES068 3.7e+03 - 0 0 88 3.6e+03 0
103 BANK OF IRELAND IE038 5.6e+03 1e+04 0 30 0 0 5.6e+03
104 DEKABANK DE028 6e+02 3.3e+03 87 2.7e+02 32 1.8e+02 30
105 DEXIA BE004 2.3e+04 3.3e+03 3.5e+03 1.6e+04 1.9e+03 1.5e+03 0.34
106 GRUPO BBK ES075 3.1e+03 - 0 0 3 3.1e+03 4
107 BANKINTER, S.A. ES069 3.6e+03 3.1e+03 0 1.2 0 3.6e+03 0
108 WESTLB AG, DUSSELDORF DE024 2.2e+03 3e+03 3.4e+02 1.1e+03 0 7.5e+02 35
109 UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE SCPA IT044 1.1e+04 1.1e+04 25 1.1e+04 0 0 0
110 CAJA DE AHORROS Y M.P. ES072 3.3e+03 2.7e+03 0 3.8e+02 0 2.9e+03 0
111 CAIXA D’ESTALVIS UNIO DE CAIXES ES076 2.6e+03 - 0 11 0 2.6e+03 13
112 BANK OF CYPRUS PUBLIC CO CY007 2.8e+03 2.4e+03 2.4e+03 36 0 58 3.2e+02
113 LANDESBANK BERLIN AG DE027 1.1e+03 2.3e+03 4.5e+02 3.3e+02 0 3.7e+02 0.075
114 ALPHA BANK GR032 5.5e+03 2e+03 5.5e+03 0 0 0 0
115 UNICREDIT S.P.A IT041 5.2e+04 9.3e+05 6.7e+02 4.9e+04 94 1.9e+03 58
116 MARFIN POPULAR BANK PUBLIC CO CY006 3.4e+03 1.7e+03 3.4e+03 0 0 0 39
117 BANCO PASTOR, S.A. ES074 2.6e+03 1.6e+03 41 1e+02 1.2e+02 2.3e+03 0
118 GRUPO CAJA3 ES078 1.5e+03 - 0 0 0 1.5e+03 8.4
119 TT HELLENIC POSTBANK S.A. GR035 5.3e+03 9.3e+02 5.3e+03 0 0 0 0
120 EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS S.A. GR030 8.9e+03 8.8e+02 8.8e+03 1e+02 0 0 0
121 ESPIRITO SANTO GROUP, PT055 3.1e+03 6.2e+03 3.1e+02 0 2.7e+03 55 0
122 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF GREECE GR034 7.9e+03 7.5e+02 7.9e+03 0 0 0 0
123 CAJA DE AHORROS DE VITORIA ES080 6e+02 - 0 0 0 6e+02 0
124 ING BANK NV NL047 1.1e+04 3.5e+04 7.5e+02 7.7e+03 7.6e+02 1.9e+03 92
125 RABOBANK NEDERLAND NL048 1.1e+03 - 3.8e+02 4.4e+02 82 1.6e+02 60
126 WUERTTEMBERGISCHE LV Wuetter. LV 7.7e+02 1.2e+02 85 4.5e+02 52 1.8e+02 8
127 NYKREDIT DK011 1.1e+02 - 22 88 0 0 0
128 MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA ES073 3.3e+03 58 6 3.1e+02 0 2.9e+03 0
129 CAJA DE AHORROS Y M.P. ES081 6 58 0 0 0 6 0
130 BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI IT042 3.3e+04 1.9e+03 8.1 3.2e+04 2e+02 2.8e+02 0
131 COLONYA - CAIXA D’ESTALVIS DE ES082 26 - 0 0 0 26 0
132 BANQUE ET CAISSE D’EPARGNE DE LU045 2.8e+03 2.9e+03 85 2.4e+03 1.8e+02 1.7e+02 0
133 PIRAEUS BANK GROUP GR033 8.2e+03 -1.9e+03 8.2e+03 0 0 0 0
134 NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE GR031 1.9e+04 -4.3e+03 1.9e+04 0 0 0 18
135 ZURICH FINANCIAL Zurich 8.7e+03 2.5e+04 0 4.2e+03 3.7e+02 3.7e+03 3.7e+02
136 MITSUI Mitsui 6.4e+02 6.9e+04 0 3.7e+02 25 1.7e+02 76
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